THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW REGARDING INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE SELFDEFENSE
A LEGAL THEORY OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY
David Frolick*
Every nation without exception seeks security-the state of being free
from danger.' There are a multitude of ways in which security can be
ensured, but it is our thesis that the best guarantee of protection in times
of danger is the use of military force. It is always used when all other
efforts have failed. At the present time the intertwining of national
interests and the dependence of all states on certain goods or the strategic locations of other states have caused nations to join together in a
network of collective security commitments.
Before discussing the characteristics of a collective-security commitment, it is necessary to establish a framework within which the ideal
security undertaking would be found. It would necessitate: (1) that each
state have a firm commitment to ensure the survival of the system-to
the point of sacrificing its own interests for that of another,' (2) that
there be a tried and true method for determining the aggressor,3 (3) that
the individual states have no inhibitions about participating in actions
against the aggressor,4 (4) that the combined power of the states be so
great as to defeat the aggressor-success being the standard by which
to judge the validity of the system, and (5) that the potential aggressor
know the extent of power aligned against it and the resolve of other
states to use it.'
Many scholars feel that the only true collective-security organization
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is one which is universal with a centralization of power so that all states
are bound to each other and there is no weakness in the chain. 6 The
absence of that factor plus the procedural failures of the Security Council have prevented the United Nations from becoming the collectivesecurity guarantor that originally had been hoped for. The recognition
of this fact has caused the development of many bilateral and multilateral alliances for protective purposes. The more well-known and "classic" ones are those involving the superpowers, and of these it is the
multilateral treaties that concern us most.
The United States has reaffirmed World War II commitments and
historic ties to its Latin American neighbors through the InterAmerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty)7 and the Organization of American States (O.A.S.). 8 The Latin American states looked
upon these treaties as blunting the power with which the United States
had controlled the hemisphere, while the United States undoubtedly saw
them as a means of maintaining the status quo and ensuring American
hegemony.
Soviet imperialism was perceived as the greatest threat in the immediate post-war world, and United States policy planners believed that a
free and strong Western Europe protecting American interests had to
be guaranteed. While the idea of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO)9 originated with the Europeans,'" United States officials had
been thinking along similar lines. The concept was that the states should
be bound to protect their common interests so that the wounds of Europe would not become places for communist infection.
When the West was put to the test in Korea it had to prove itself able
to mount the force necessary to stand behind its resolve to contain
communism. The policy of containment, forged in the late forties and
tested in the early fifties, found its logical fulfillment in the "pactomania" of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Besides concluding
numerous bilateral treaties, Dulles completed the ring around the Communist world with the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)"
'See authorities cited note 2, supra. For an especially good critique, see H. KELSEN, supra note
1, at 29-31.
'Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681 (1948), T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77 [hereinafter cited as
Rio Treaty].
'The T.A.S. is constituted under the Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30,
1948, [1951] 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3.
'NATO was established under the North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241 (1949),
T.I.A.S. No. 1964, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter cited as NATO Treaty].
"See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY: DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, S. DOC. No. 48, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. 61-62 (1949).
"SEATO was established under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, Sept. 8, 1954,
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and his encouragement of the British-sponsored Central Treaty Organization, or Baghdad Pact."
The Soviet Union, of course, was not sitting idly by. Following the
entry of the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO 3 the Soviet
Union linked its bilateral treaties with the Eastern European satellites
through the Warsaw Treaty Organization.'
It may be useful at this point to delineate briefly several characteristics that are commonly shared by the treaties under discussion. One such
characteristic is the reference by each of the treaties 5 to some facet of
[1955] I U.S.T. 81, T.I.A.S. No. 3170, 209 U.N.T.S. 28 [hereinafter cited as SEATO Treaty].
"Pact of Mutual Cooperation Between Iraq and Turkey, Feb. 24, 1955, 233 U.N.T.S. 199,
adhered to by United Kingdom, Apr. 4, 1955, 233 U.N.T.S. 218 [hereinafter cited as Baghdad
Pact].
"Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany,
Oct. 23, 1954, [1955] 5 U.S.T. 5707, T.I.A.S. No. 3428, 243 U.N.T.S. 308.
"The organization is constituted by the following states: Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, German
Democratic Republic, Poland, Romania, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Czechoslovakia.
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, May 24, 1955, 219 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter cited as Warsaw Pact].
"Baghdad Pact, art. IIl:
The High Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any interference whatsoever in
each other's internal affairs. They will settle any dispute between themselves in a peaceful way in accordance with the United Nations Charter.
NATO Treaty, preamble:
The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all
governments. ...
NATO Treaty, art. I:
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any
international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner
that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered, and to refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations.
Rio Treaty, art. I:
The High Contracting Parties formally condemn war and undertake in their international relations not to resort to the threat or the use of force in any manner inconsistent
with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations or of this Treaty.
SEATO Treaty, preamble:
The Parties to this Treaty . . . [r]eiterating their faith in the purposes and principles
set forh in the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all
peoples and governments . ...
SEATO Treaty, art. I:
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any
international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner
that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations.
Warsaw Pact, preamble:
The Contracting Parties . . . guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of
the United Nations; . . ..
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the United Nations Charter. In each case there is in general terms a
pledge to live by the rules of the Charter, and most of the treaties look
to article 5116 as authority for their creation. It is worth recalling in this
connection that article 51 was included in the Charter at least partly in
response to insistence by Latin American states that potential inaction
by the Security Council might compromise both their security and their
historic ability to settle regional problems among themselves.
Another area of comparability among the treaties is the similarity of
expression involving the casus foederis. The typical statement is found
in the NATO Treaty, which reads in part:
the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them
shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they
agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise
of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by
taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties,
such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to
restore and maintain security.
any such attack and measures taken as a result shall be reported to
the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and
maintain international peace and security.'"
There are additional provisions in the treaties for consultation as to
what security measures are appropriate to take.' 8 The options range
Warsaw Pact, art. I:
The Contracting Parties undertake, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations Organization, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force and to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security are not endangered.
"U.N. CHARTER art. 51 provides:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of selfdefense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter
to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
"NATO Treaty, art. 5.
"E.g., NATO Treaty, art. 4 provides:
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial
integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.
Rio Treaty, art. 8 provides:
For purposes of this Treaty, the measures on which the Organ of Consultation may agree
will comprise one or more of the following: recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions;
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from doing nothing, to using collective force. The glaring weakness in
these provisions is that no definition has been given "armed attack,"
and thus the question of when responsive collective action is justified
becomes wholly theoretical and subject to circumstance. That is one
area for concern. Similarly, a problem arises as to what kind of protection may be given. In all cases, save the Inter-American Treaty, provisions for mutual defense are outwardly directed with no collective protection assured to the states in case one of their allies has a change of
mind.
Some consideration might also be given the big-power dominance
which pervades such "local" treaties as the Pact of the Arab League.,'
The United Arab Republic, as a case in point, has always been the
overwhelming force within Arab councils, and rarely are decisions made
without Egyptian acquiescence. This state of affairs allows only minimal
security for the small country whose protection as a practical matter
depends upon decisions in another capital, where threats to the smaller
nation's security may not be recognized with the highest urgency.
After the United Nations Charter became effective there was considerable discussion on the meaning of "armed attack." Was it restricted
to cases where armies move across international frontiers and directly
threaten the existence of another state? Would it still allow anticipatory
self-defense, or was the Caroline rule no longer applicable in the light
of the Security Council's powers? Did the force have to be illegal? What
about the use of "self-defense?" Was this means open only to United
Nations members, only to recognized states, or to any entity able to get
a smattering of international recognition? While scholars of legal and
political theory can indicate some of the answers, usage has become the
decisive arbiter, and for good or for ill it is the precedents in practice
that provide the most determinative legal conclusions.
A brief examination of several instances of collective-security action
demonstrates that there has occurred among states a decrease in the
amount of control over the use of force and, thus, a decrease in the
amount of security that states really have. This apparently continuing
development tends to indicate an approach towards anarchy within the
international system. A discussion of this phenomenon might begin with
a consideration of the rationales for the use of military force adopted
breaking of diplomatic relations, breaking of consular relations, partial or complete
interruption of economic relations or of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and
radiotelephonic or radiotelegraphic communications; and the use of armed force.
"Pact of League of Arab States, Mar. 22, 1945, 70 U.N.T.S. 237. The following states were
signatories of the Treaty: Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen.
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by decision-makers during the last twenty years. The rationales for
action in the cases to follow should be considered in terms of both
substantive and legal soundness.
Some revisionist scholars feel that the Korean episode was an operation led and directed by the United States from beginning to end, with
United Nations cover used to gain some moral and legal credibility:
evidence the chain-of-command, some of the controversial military decisions which many of the U.N. allies viewed with disfavor, and the
"goals" and conclusion of the war.2 While the Korean War never was
based officially upon article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the United States
admittedly considered the North Korean attack a threat to American
forces in the Pacific." What the war demonstrated was that U.N. guarantees of security were so contingent upon numerous factors that reliance upon other theories of defense was necessary to ensure more than
minimal protection.
The case of the Hungarian intervention of 1956, the first "regional"
collective action of its kind, showed the selectivity and lengths to which
policy-makers might go in order to substantiate a particular policy
decision. What were looked upon in the West as fabrications of fact
were used by the Soviet Union to rationalize its action: (1) Western
interference in Hungarian internal affairs, 2 (2) recognition of the "proper" Hungarian government,23 (3) an ex post facto request for intervention, 4 and (4) an interpretation of the Warsaw Pact that would legalize
intervention without the approval of the organization. 5 There were of
course glaring errors of judgment on the part of the Soviet Union, but
the most important factor was not substantive or procedural niceties,
but the ability to succeed, for once the operation was over, it became
de facto legal. The Soviets knew in advance that they could prevent
maximum intervention by the United Nations because of the Suez crisis;
they also knew that intervention from outside the U.N. would be negligible. All that the West, and the United States in particular, could do
was hammer away at Warsaw Pact and Charter violations. 6
"See Wolfers, Collective Security and the War in Korea, 43 YALE REV. 481-96 (1954).
"See Authority of the President to Repel the Attack in Korea, 23 DEP'T STATE BULL. 173, 17677 (1950).
"See I I U.N. SCOR, 752d meeting 24, U.N. Doc. S/PV.752 (1956). See also Some Comments
on the Juristic Aspects of the "Hungarian Question", MAGYAR JOGASZ SOVETSAG 16-18 (1957).
2

See I I U.N. GAOR, 2d Emergency Special Sess. 10, U.N. Doc. A/PV.564 (1956).
See, id.; II U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 51-52, U.N. Doc. A/3592 (1957).
2
See J. SZIKSZOY, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE HUNGARIAN QUESTION 87-90 (1963).
2
'See II U.N. SCOR, 746th meeting 19-20, U.N. Doc. S/PV.746 (1956); 11 U.N. GAOR, 2d
Emergency Special Sess. 3-5, U.N. Doc. A/PV.564 (1956).
2
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When the United States sent Marines to Lebanon in 1958, was it
following the guidelines of its Middle-East policy as enunciated in the
Eisenhower Doctrine?27 The 1957 statement announced that by economic and military assistance the United States intended to prevent a
communist takeover of any country in the Middle East; the statement
further provided that direct military intervention would be used only
"when an armed attack has taken place." Secretary Dulles stated that
the Doctrine was completely compatible with article 5128 and that it
would not be used unless the President determined that an aggressor
state was communist controlled, that there was an act of aggression, and
that the attacked state had officially requested the use of United States
military force.29 At the time of the Doctrine's promulgation only one
country not already tied to the Western defense network embraced
it-Lebanon. The crisis was precipitated by domestic actions attributable to a misjudgment of the political climate by President Chamoun. He
charged Syria, then part of the United Arab Republic, with infiltrating
Lebanon and supplying weapons to Lebanese dissidents.30 Lebanon
subsequently took the case to the Arab League, but Egyptian influence
prevented the League's reaching any substantive conclusion, 3' and Lebanon turned to the United Nations. 31 When satisfaction was not received, United States intervention was requested. 33 It is noteworthy
that the United Nations observation team found little evidence to substantiate the charges. 34 But when the Iraqi coup was perceived by some
policy-makers as indicative of an effort by President Nasser to control
the region, 35 the Doctrine was reinterpreted to sanction intervention on
behalf of any country in the area whose independence was vital to
United States security. Interestingly enough, the Lebanese army contributed very little to putting down the "revolution," and by the time
the Marines had landed the crisis was pretty well resolved. The initial
explanation on the part of the United States was that the President of
"Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East of Mar. 9, 1957, Pub. L.
No. 85-7, 71 Stat. 5.
2'Hearingson the President's Proposal on the Middle East Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations and Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. 290-91 (1957).
2'Hearings on Economic and Military Cooperation with Nations in the General Area of the
Middle East Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1957). See
also Secretary Dulles' News Conference of September 10, 37 DEP'T STATE BULL. 527 (1957).
"See, e.g., 5 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1162 (1965).

"See R. BARNET, INTERVENTION AND REVOLUTION 144 (1968).
"See 13 U.N. SCOR, Supp. Apr.-June 1958, at 33, U.N. Doc. S/4007 (1958).
23See 2 D. EISENHOWER, MEMOIRS: WAGING PEACE 270 (1965); C. THAYER,

DIPLOMAT

(1959); 5 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 30, at 1164.

3 U.N. SCOR, Supp. July-Sept. 1958, at 18-20, U.N. Doc. S/4040 and Add.l (1958).
"See 2 D. EISENHOWER, supra note 33, at 270.
31
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Lebanon had made a request for American assistance. That message,
if it exists, has never been made public and would provide the missing
link in an otherwise complete story." The Lebanese relied upon article
51 of the Charter and interpreted it broadly to support their view that
the result of an armed attack is of much graver importance than the
means by which it is carried out. 7 It was difficult for the United States
to answer the charge that by its precipitate actions it had subverted the
Security Council's role in the crisis. There was no armed attack, but
"collective" action under article 51 nevertheless proved again that states
could move outside the Charter at will and that purely internal problems
could bring about an international crisis.
While the Inter-American system occupies a special place in the
United Nations system, there is some question of which organization
has supremacy in local issues. Until the mid-sixties the Organization of
American States, and more specifically the United States, appeared to
have the upper hand, as evidenced by the use of articles 611 and 811 of
the Rio Treaty, rather than article 51 of the Charter as legal justification
for the Cuban quarantine. Those two articles deal specifically with consultation and action in the event of a threat to the peace. The motives
for using them in the Cuban case were apparent: (1) the necessity to
keep the decision-making process under United States control as much
as possible (the member states had no alternative but to ratify the course
of action previously announced by President Kennedy),' (2) the necessity to avoid a ready-made precedent for use by the Soviets against the
United States, for example in Berlin or Laos," and (3) the impression
that an airtight case could not be made under article 51.42 Several schol36
The Deputy Legal Adviser for Administration, Department of State, has stated that the
document remains classified in accordance with provisions of Executive Order 10501, as amended,
and remains so classified in the interest of national defense. Letter from J. Edward Lyerly to David
Frolick, March 20, 1970.
3713 U.N. SCOR, 833d meeting 3-4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.833 (1958).
'Rio Treaty, art. 6:
If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an
armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or by any other
fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation
shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case
of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which
should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and
security of the Continent.
39
The text of article 8 of the Rio Treaty is reproduced in note 18, supra.
"°SeeR. HILSMAN, To MOVE A NATION 211 (1968); Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 A.J.I.L.
546, 558 (1963).
4
See E. ABEL, THE MISSILE CRISIS 115 (1966).
4
See T. SORENSON, KENNEDY 789 (1966).
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ars have theorized that a case could have been made under article 51
and have cited among other things in support of that position the speed
with which modern technology can leave a country with a fait accompli. 43 Notwithstanding the argument, one thing is clear: There was no
real United Nations authorization for the action, which thus contributed
further to the Charter's deterioration. There is substance, however, in
Secretary of State Acheson's observation that when a state's survival is
threatened, it cannot afford the luxury of legalities."
The unilateral intervention by the United States in the Dominican
Republic demonstrates the degree of power that the superpower of a
regional organization possesses. Initially dispatched on a "humanitarian
mission, ' ' 5 the Marine contingent became a holding operation against
the possible communist take-over of the country. Realizing that its legal
position was otherwise questionable, the United States attempted to
blunt criticism by involving the Organization of American States. 6 The
United States represented that it was acting on behalf of the Organization of American States,4" although the latter actually knew nothing of
the operation until the troops were ashore. The United States defended
its action by saying that there was no intervention in the internal affairs
of another country,48 that it was participating in a role considered proper
for a regional organization under the Charter,49 and that circumstances
had changed so drastically over the years that the organization had to
recognize that conspiratorial attack fomented from abroad requires an
immediate response.50 The strength of this position was shaken, however, when the United States became involved in an inconsistent numbers game of communist strength,5 when documentation became available to show American manipulation of the intervention designed to
ensure that its kind of government would be installed,52 and when the
"See Fenwick, The Quarantine Against Cuba: Legal or Illegal?, 57 A.J.I.L. 588, 589-90 (1963);
MacChesney, Some Comments on the "Quarantine" of Cuba, 57 A.J.I.L. 592, 594-96 (1963);
McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 A.J.I.L. 597, 598-601 (1963).
"Remarks by the Honorable Dean Acheson, 57th Annual Meeting, American Society of International Law, 1963 ASIL PROCEEDINGS 13, 14.
"LYNDON B. JOHNSON, 1965 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 461
(1966); U.S. Acts to Meet Threat in Dominican Republic, 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 738 (1965).
"See Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 26, 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 938, 941-42 (1965).
"See U.S. Acts to Meet Threat in Dominican Republic, supra note 45, at 740-41.
"920 U.N. SCOR, 1200th meeting 33-34, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1200 (1965).
"See 2 A. CHAYES, T. EHRLICH & A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS 1186
(1969).
"See id. at 1179-81; III CONG. REC. 10,733-34 (daily ed. May 20, 1965).
"See 20 U.N. SCOR, 1200th meeting 4-5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1200 (1965); Draper, The Dominican Revolt: A Case Study in American Policy, 40 COMMENTARY, Dec. 1965, at 53-55.
"See R. EVANS & R. NOVAK, LYNDON B. JOHNSON: THE EXERCISE OF POWER 538-39 (1968);
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United States had to cajole the Organization of American States into
using the vote of the Dominican delegate, representing a nonexisting
government, to approve the Inter-American Peace Force. Also interesting is the undercurrent of opinion that no American President could
3
allow another communist government in the Caribbean.1
While a state may legitimately intervene to protect its citizens-an
exaggerated form of self-defense-the intervention must be for that
reason and that reason alone.5 4 Once the protective umbrella has been
brought to those people, the intervening force must withdraw and not
interfere in the internal activities of the country. That certainly was not
the case in the Dominican Republic. The United States wrote its own
ticket by informing the remaining authorities-or those people the U.S.
chose to be in authority-in the Dominican Republic that intervention
could be justified only upon humanitarian grounds and not because of
communist influence. The Dominican authorities then changed their
request to conform to this guideline. Since there was never a substantiation of the charges that outsiders had perpetrated the revolt, communist
aggression provided no support for the intervention. If there was any
aggression at all, it was by the United States,55 and no Inter-American
Peace Force can change that fact. Perhaps an even more critical lesson
of the Dominican affair is a realization of the manner in which a state,
because of its superpower status, may flaunt the rules of its own regional
organization.
In further connection with United States involvement abroad, nothing has aroused both so much anxiety and so much dismay as the legal
leg supporting United States participation in the Indo-Chinese War.
From the beginning, issues have been raised which remain unsatisfactorily answered. The veracity of the facts of the Gulf of Tonkin incident
is still doubted, yet it was unquestionably this incident that brought
about the first massive display of air power over North Vietnam and
P. GEYELIN, LYNDON B. JOHNSON AND THE WORLD 249-54 (1966); 111 CONG. REC. 23,367 (daily
ed. Sept. 17, 1965); III CONG. REC. 23,001 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1965).
"3See, e.g., P. GEYELIN, supra note 52, at 254.
"Comment, The Dominican Crisis: A n Examination of Traditional and Contemporary Concepts
of International Law, 4 DUQUESNE L. REV. 547, 551-52 (1966).
5
See McLaren, The Dominican Crisis: An Inter-American Dilemma, 4 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 178,
184 (1966).
"See 110 CONG. REC. 18,133-39, 18,423-26 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Morse); Hearings on Southeast Asia Resolution Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations and Senate Comm. on Armed
Services, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); Hearings on Foreign Assistance Act of 1968, Part
I- Vietnam Before Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1968); Hearings
on the Gulf of Tonkin, the 1964 Incidents Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
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precipitated serious movement up the escalation ladder. The Government's legal position5" has rested upon several premises: (1) article 51
of the Charter allows individual and collective self-defense on behalf of
South Vietnam, a government which has requested the assistance of the
United States; (2) the defense of South Vietnam is consistent with the
Charter; and (3) the measures taken in self-defense have been reported
to the United Nations Security Council in accordance with article 51.
Secretary of State Rusk added to these premises with his determination
that SEATO provided some legal basis for the undertaking." Several
scholars take another approach and criticize the Government for what
can be called "sloppy scholarship." 9 Among other things, the article 51
argument loses credence because (1) there are overtones of an insurrection which limits aid to the governmental authorities; (2) it is unclear
whether South Vietnam is really a state or a zone of a temporarily
divided state; (3) the State Department has been unable to supply a
formal request for assistance from South Vietnam-instead, such a
request reportedly has been "understood"; 0 and (4) how collective the
self-defense is has been unsettled. The United States, as we well know,
has carried the heaviest burden of the fighting, as evidenced by the
minor role of South Vietnam in the military decision-making process.
Under the SEATO Treaty there is a duty to consult before taking
action,"1 but that consultation never took place. Some of those SEATO
5

E.g., Memorandum of March 8, 1965, in STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN

RELATIONS,

90TH CONG., 2D SESS., BACKGROUND INFORMATION RELATING TO SOUTHEAST ASIA AND VIETNAM

148 (Comm. Print 1968); U.S.

DEP'T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, THE LEGALITY

OF UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN THE DEFENSE

OF VIET NAM

(Dep't State Pub. No. 8062,

1966).
5

STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN

RELATIONS, 90TH CONG.,

2D SESS.,

BACKGROUND

185 (Comm, Print 1968).
The list is lengthy, but a good compilation can be found in I & 2 THE VIETNAM WAR AND

INFORMATION RELATING TO SOUTHEAST ASIA AND VIETNAM
5
INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMITTEE

(R. Falk ed. 1968-1969) and

CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL OF THE LAWYERS

ON AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS VIETNAM, VIETNAM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

(1967).
"116 CONG. REC. 10,508-09 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Fulbright).
"SEATO Treaty, art. 4:
I. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area
against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and
agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its
constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.
2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the
territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area or
of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph I of this Article
from time to time apply is threatened in .any way other than by armed attack or is
affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the
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allies who have supplied support for the effort have done so only because
the United States is picking up the bill." The effect is nevertheless to
provide a comfortable facade for making U.S. actions more palatable
both legally and morally.
The invasion of Cambodia, although hidden beneath a cloak of selfdefense," rested on extremely shaky ground. The goals of the operation-other than finding COSVN (the military headquarters for Communist operations in South Vietnam)-have been somewhat achieved,
but at what cost? The war has now spread farther and farther away from
South Vietnam, and both Cambodia and Laos are threatened with destruction. Being a Monday-morning quarterback is easy, because decisions can be questioned from a detached viewpoint, but one must ask
whether conditions along the frontier had changed drastically enough to
warrant the invasion. As in other cases already mentioned, there was
never a formal request for the use of force prior to the invasion;" the
Cambodians had no choice other than ex post facto approval. 5 Once
again, the other side was accused of aggression, 6 while allied violations
were conveniently overlooked. But what is the most frightening aspect
of all is the United States posture of adopting and "legalizing" actions
that it had found so abhorrent in its enemies. In so many words, if the
other side is doing it, so can the United States.
One must certainly recall the position of the United States and the
West following the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. While the
public pretexts for the invasion and the manner in which it was carried
out are reminiscent of the Hungarian invasion, the one salient attribute
of the Czechoslovakian incursion is the Brezhnev Doctrine. Succinctly
area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measure which should
be taken for the common defense.
62See Hearings on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad Before the
Subcomm. on UnitedStates Security Agreements and Commitments A broadof the Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 355-58, pt. 3, at 624-25 (1969).
"The U.S. note to the U.N. Security Council labeled the action "collective self-defense." See
Nelson, Contemporary Practiceof the United States Relating to InternationalLaw, 64 A.J.l.L.
928, 933 (1970); Address by John R. Stevenson, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, HammarskjSld Forum of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, May 28, 1970, reprinted in
Hammarskj6ld Forum: Expansion of the Viet Nam War into Cambodia-The Legal Issues, 45
N.Y.U.L. REV. 625, 657 (1970).
"4The Cambodian government had asked for U.S. military assistance prior to the invasion, but
Presidential Press Secretary Ron Zeigler stated the invasion was the U.S. response to the Cambodian request. See Semple, Nixon Sends Combat Forces to Cambodia to Drive Communists From
Staging Zone, N.Y. Times, May I, 1970, at I, col. 1.
65
Kamm, Red Troops Cut Highway 29 Miles from Phnompenh, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1970, at
16, col. 7.
"Transcript of President'sAddress to the Nation on Military Action in Cambodia, N.Y. Times,
May 1, 1970, at 2, col. 2.
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stated it recognizes that treaties are valid only as long as they do not
conflict with the progress of socialism; and when that progress is compromised, it is the duty of the Socialist commonwealth to intervene.
This is essentially the Soviet view of self-defense.
As much as that kind of policy is rejected, one need only substitute
"democracy" or "anticommunism" to recognize the pretexts of collective security over the last 20 years. While it is always nice to rely upon
the law, it must go by the wayside if there are no choices but breaking
it. In most instances the violations are carried out with more subtlety,
for example, by means of a "reinterpretation" of the law. Yet, enough
of these reinterpretations have occurred to indicate that the law has been
changed-and changed markedly.
Now, it is the national interests of a country that are most important
to it, and if a state has the power, its interests will be considered superior
to those of a multilateral organization-especially if the interests clash.
This comment has hopefully demonstrated that the security provided a
state by a regional organization is so dependent upon the allied superpower's foreign office as to be almost nonexistent. When member states
protest an action of the organization, it is no uncertain display of courage, because they know very well that they may be disciplined. Instead
of mutual equality and respect, fear has become the controlling factor
in many organizations. The kind of fear we are talking about is not only
of economic reprisal, but also the knowledge that failure to play along
in the game can put a country in a precarious position.
Therefore, when one compares what "has been" with what "should
be," security-real security-is minimal at best and fading rapidly.
Instead, we have a situation wherein legal substance and procedures are
flaunted at will with the result that collective security is used to justify
the use of military force in any of the following situations: (1) where
there has been no request for assistance by the country threatened, (2)
where occurrence of the prerequisite "armed attack" is questionable, (3)
where the United Nations is already substantially involved, (4) where
the regional organization's approval is ex post facto, and (5) in cases
where no substantive justification other than. "anticommunism" or
"anticapitalism" can be advanced. Consequently, once the "collective"
action is under way, the country most affected by the fighting may likely
discover that its role in deciding the outcome will be minor; rather, the
solution will be dictated by other nations.
The only conclusion to be reached is that by the exercise of selfdefense within progressively broader limits, security has not been increased; the use of military force has been, instead. In fact, the present
situation is one of a revised bellumjustum: As long as collective security
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is cited, the military action is legal. If toleration of this formula continues, the international dilemma will grow worse, since more states will
rely increasingly upon a faulty rationale to take military action, whether
justified in law or not.

